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Aylin Gürzel
Turkey’s Role in Defusing
the Iranian Nuclear Issue
In May 2010, while the United States and other Western powers in the
UN Security Council were drafting a resolution on further sanctions to pressure
Iran over its controversial nuclear program, Turkey and Brazilthen
non-permanent members of the Security Councilannounced a fuel-swap
deal with Iran. The Tehran Declaration, as it was called, stipulated that
20-percent-enriched nuclear fuel was to be provided to Iran for its use in the
Tehran Research Reactor, which produces medical isotopes, in exchange for the
removal of 1,200 kilograms of 3.5-percent-low-enriched uranium (LEU) to
Turkey.1 Initial reactions to the deal varied, but there was fear that the
20-percent-enriched fuel would enable Iran to further enrich uranium and attain
the level necessary to construct a nuclear weapon more rapidly.2
Turkey and Iran had been discussing a deal for nearly eight months, since U.S.
President Barack Obama sent a similar proposal to Turkish Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan in October 2009. Iranian officials initially stalled, not wanting
to give up their uranium; however, when they received intelligence that China
and Russia (sometime Iranian allies) were in accord with the UN sanctions, Iran
reluctantly agreed to the swap deal brokered by Turkey and Brazil. As a result,
the deal was regarded as a ‘‘tactical move’’ by the international community,
particularly the United States.3
The United States did not approve of the nuclear swap agreement because
‘‘it did not address the continued production of uranium enriched to 20 percent
inside Iranian territory.’’ 4 Since the 1980s, the United States has maintained that
Iran has sought to divide the international community by making only marginal
concessions on the nuclear issue, thus buying time to continue its uranium
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production. China hesitantly ‘‘welcomed the deal as a step in the direction of a
peaceful solution,’’5 but Russia flatly declined the deal and discarded any link
between the swap deal and the Security Council sanctions. France criticized the
swap because it did not involve any progress on essential issuesit did not address
nuclear weapons proliferation challenges, suspending sustained uranium
enrichment activity on Iranian territory, or the issue of transparency. ‘‘Let us
not deceive ourselves, a solution to the [fuel] question . . .would do nothing to
settle the problem posed by the Iranian nuclear program,’’ French Foreign
Ministry spokesman Bernard Valero maintained in a statement.6 Turkish and
Brazilian officials considered the deal a success, however, and announced it as an
accomplishment and a potential breakthrough. Turkey’s Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Ahmet Davutoglu, stated that the agreement ‘‘demonstrated once again
that resolution could be reached through diplomacy.’’7
In putting together the fuel-swap deal, Turkey, like Brazil, was trying to defend
the autonomy of non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) to enrich uranium for
producing electricity in their own territory and strengthen the right of NNWS to
develop peaceful nuclear activities. Turkey also believed that finding a solution to
the Iranian nuclear issue without consulting other powers about the negotiation
process would burnish its credentials for membership in the elite club of
‘‘responsible’’ and ‘‘world order-supporting states,’’8 which Ankara views as
important as Turkey seeks to assert its growing power both regionally and globally.
Turkey’s Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy
Although Turkey has been part of global nuclear non-proliferation efforts and
endorsed international initiatives to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, it
has remained indifferent toward the Iranian nuclear program for many years.9
Turkey signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on January 28, 1969,
and ratified it on April 17, 1980. Ankara also played a role in international
efforts to curb nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, participating vigorously
in the process of enhancing the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA)
verification system to make safeguards inspections much more invasive after the
1991 Gulf War. It became part of the Additional Protocol (which enhanced the
IAEA’s ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities) by signing and ratifying
the document in July 2000.10 Turkey also is part of the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG), a group of nuclear supplier countries that attempts to curb nuclear
proliferation by not selling dual-use technology (technology that can be used for
both peaceful and military aims) to NNWS.
Turkey’s motivation for participating in nuclear non-proliferation efforts is
largely due to its NATO membership (since 1952); Turkish territory is protected by
a ‘‘nuclear umbrella’’ against attack from other countries, including Iran, so it has
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little military need to develop its own nuclear weapons. Moreover, Turkey possesses
NATO tactical nuclear weapons and continues to deploy them on its territory
(they are U.S. nuclear weapons under NATO’s authority). Some were sent back to
the United States after the end of the Cold War, but some are still deployed in
Incirlik.11 Turkey has security guarantees because NATO’s Article V states that an
armed attack against one or more NATO members is considered an attack on them
all.
Turkey is also seeking candidacy in the European Union, and accordingly has
endorsed international policies intended to curb weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) proliferation in general, and nuclear non-proliferation in particular in
the Middle East.12 Given the protection accorded from the above organizations,
Turkey itself has no real reason to develop a nuclear weapons program. If it did, it
would ‘‘be under the scrutiny of the relevant institutions of the EU throughout
the accession process,’’13 and if the accession process is successfully completed,
Turkey will have to become party to the EURATOM [the European Atomic
Energy Community] treaty. In other words, Turkey would have to comply with
this treaty, which permits only peaceful applications of nuclear energy.14
Factors Shaping Ankara’s Iran Policy
Since 2002, with the advent of the government
of the Justice and Development Party (AKP),
Turkey has shifted its role toward Iran’s nuclear
program. It moved first from an observer to a
facilitator, then more recently to a mediator.
Turkey’s own plans for nuclear energy have
shaped its stance. The AKP intends to develop
nuclear energy, and has signed a deal with the
Russian Federation to build a nuclear power
plant at Akkuyu, Buyukeceliin Mersin
Province. Turkey is also trying to conclude a
deal whereby Japan would build nuclear energy facilities in Turkey.
These plans are being carried out with the aim to ‘‘[remain] in good standing
with the NPT and [continue] to abide by the stringent inspections called for in
the IAEA’s Additional Protocol.’’15 Turkey has positioned itself as an advocate of
non-proliferation, while maintaining a strict interpretation of Article IV of the
NPT,16 which states that every member of the treaty has the right to pursue
peaceful nuclear activities. Turkish officials have challenged any proposal
intended to make it difficult for NPT parties to access nuclear technologies
for the purpose of producing nuclear energy; they have perceived these
propositions as a threat to their nuclear aspirations.17 Numerous Turkish
Since 2002, and again
in late 2008, Turkey
has shifted its role
toward Iran’s nuclear
program.
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officials and parliamentarians contend that if sovereign states meet their
commitments and fulfill their obligations under international agreements,
then neither the international community nor any individual country should
intercede in Turkey’s domestic affairs.18
That is not to say that concerns about Iran’s activities do not exist. Several
interest groups and parliamentarians, including Faruk Loğoğlu (a former Turkish
ambassador to the United States, the current deputy of the opposition party
People’s Republic Party (CHP), and a member of the Parliamentary Foreign
Affairs Committee) share the international community’s concerns regarding
Iran’s intentions. Loğoğlu noted the ‘‘disparity between the characteristics of
Iran’s nuclear program and its supposed peaceful purposes as well as the
suitability of its facilities for making nuclear weapons.’’19
The question is what Ankara should do about it? Although not explicitly voiced,
Turkish actors are concerned that international proceedings against Iran might
form a precedent for sanctions on states such as Turkey.20 Other Turkish officials
feel that sanctions would only delay Iran’s nuclear capability to produce a weapon,
not discourage its nuclear ambitions. Turkish trade with Iran is also a factor. The
Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchange of Turkey, the Independent
Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association, and the Confederation of
Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey have become fundamental actors in
Turkey’s foreign-policymaking. Turkish trade with Iran has increased due to these
actors’ preferences, and Turkey’s pro-Iran position on the Iranian nuclear program,
as well as its increasing aspiration to play a constructive role as a mediating regional
power, can be connected to the influence of these organizations.21
The supply of energy has been a main component of Turkish—Iranian
relations as well. In July 1996, under Turkish Prime Minister Necmettin
Erbakan, the two countries signed a $23 billion natural gas deal. In a RAND
report, analyst F. Stephen Larrabee confirmed that since then, energy trade
interactions between Ankara and Tehran have continued to increase gradually.22
Turkey imports 30 percent of its gas from Iran and cannot afford detached
relations with a prospective market, which is probably what would happen if
Turkey chose to carry out U.S. unilateral sanctions and pressured Iran not to
enrich uranium in its territory.23
The AKP’s Islamic roots also have played a part in Turkey’s policy. Professor
Mustafa Kibaroğlu has noted that ‘‘the debateconcerning the Iranian nuclear
programis rather emotional, reactive to daily events, and also partly
ideological.’’24 For Turkish foreign policymakers, the ‘‘Muslim world’’ is an
autonomous and peculiar geopolitical region where Turkey could be influential
diplomatically and assume a primary role. Prime Minister Erdoğan has stated that
if all obstacles could be removed, the world’s 57 Muslim countries would be able
to form a self-sufficient group.25 This perspective fits within the changing social
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and political texture of Turkey. Soner Çağaptay, director of the Turkish Research
Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, stresses that ‘‘religion
remained the salient national identity during the Ottoman period,’’26 and now it
seems that religion is again becoming an important part of the national identity
for the Turkish population and the AKP government in particular. The Turkish
Economic and Social Studies Foundation confirms that the number of people
identifying themselves as Muslim, rather than Turkish, increased by 10 percent
between 2002 and 2007, and continues to increase daily.27
Ziya Öniş, professor of International Political Economy at Koc University in
Istanbul and Director of the Center for Research on Globalization and
Democratic Governance, also maintains that Turkish foreign policy has
moved beyond ‘‘the sphere of economics; [to] considerations relating to
culture and identity, [which] are seen as a fundamental part of historical
depth.’’ 28 Since it came to power, the AKP has worked to intensify relations
with Iran and other Muslim countries in the region. The West often ascribes the
Turkish—Iranian relationship to ‘‘the religiosity
of the AKP and the party’s alleged sympathies for
Iran’s conservative clerical elites.’’29 This
perspective is somewhat true, in the sense that
AKP parliamentarians wanted to establish better
ties with Iran because of its Muslim identity.
However, most AKP parliamentarians have
realized this is not feasible because Iran has not
recognized Turkey as a reliable partner. On the
contrary, Iran has perceived Turkey as not only a competitor, but a threat.30 As
Mustafa Akyol posits, ‘‘Although the cadre at the top of the party is generally
pious, it has not imposed sharia rule in Turkey, as some secularist Turks have
feared, and has not geared its foreign policy toward spreading Islamism.’’31 The
AKP government has acted pragmatically, trying to balance its relationship with
both the West and the East.
In this context, in late 2008, Turkey’s stance toward the Iranian nuclear issue
changed, due to its aspiration to play an active role in resolving the dispute
about the program. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, then the advisor
of Prime Minister Erdogan, was one of the leading actors in the Turkish
government and became the Foreign Minister in May 2009. He wanted to
engage in active diplomacy in resolving global disputes. Thus, Erdogan
announced that Turkey could mediate between Iran and the United States.32
The Obama administration welcomed Turkey’s support to engage with Iran.
Additionally, Mohamed ElBaradei, then the IAEA director general, also asked
for Turkey’s diplomatic support to persuade Iran to end the stalemate and return
to the table.
Iran has perceived
Turkey as not only a
competitor, but a
threat.
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Moreover, Turkey has not favored sanctions against Iran. This is mainly
because Turkey wants to pursue a multi-dimensional and multi-track foreign
policy,33 one that can boast of ‘‘zero problems with neighbors.’’ This concept
derives from Davutoglu’s book, Strategic Depth, which promotes Turkish
engagement with the region under the idea that Turkey is a key fulcrum
between the East and the West. Such a policy would hesitate to provoke a
neighbor, like Iran, with harsh sanctions. Moreover, Turkey imports
approximately 200,000 barrels per day of oil from Iran, which represents over
7 percent of Iran’s oil exports, and it has gradually increased its imports from Iran
since the AKP administration came to power.
Ankara regards Tehran not only as a significant neighbor but also an important
factor in the Middle East, South Asia, and the Caucasus. In this regard, Turkey
wanted to help resolve conflicting views and disagreements over Iran’s nuclear
program through engagement and dialogue, not coercion and sanctions, in order
to maintain peace and stability in the region. Turkey’s objective was to convince
Iran to respond fully to the concerns of the international community. By
brokering the fuel-swap deal, Turkey attempted to find a diplomatic solution to
Iran’s nuclear issue in order to evade a military attack on Iran.
Turkey’s involvement in the 2010 Tehran Declaration came under fire
internationally, which initially surprised Ankara. From Turkey’s (or at least the
AKP’s) point of view, its involvement was simply intended to maintain peace
and stability, avoid conflict, and fend off international sanctions that would also
damage Turkish commercial interests with Iran. Turkey also wished to
consolidate its position as a strong regional player in resolving disputes.
Turkish diplomats maintained that Brazilian officials were trying to conclude
a deal parallel to Turkish efforts, so they decided to join forces.34 Like Brazil,
Turkey desired ‘‘to raise its status in the eyes of the international community.’’35
Also, both the Turks and the Brazilians believe that institutions such as the
Security Council ‘‘reflect asymmetries in the distribution of power in the
international system,’’36 so it should not have come a surprise that the two
decided to cooperate and circumvent the UNSC efforts. While all these factors
contributed to its stance, however, Turkey’s principal motivations were its past
nuclear non-proliferation policy and its future prospects as a regional mediator.
To achieve a peaceful settlement on Iran’s nuclear file, Turkish officials
proclaimed that Turkey and Brazil ‘‘concluded the ‘Tehran Joint Declaration’
that was based on initial proposals of the IAEA, the Russian Federation and the
U.S.’’37 Turkish officials claimed that they ‘‘had worked tirelessly to effectively
address this issue in seamless consultation with the P51 and Iran.’’38 Even
though Security Council member states said that the fuel-swap deal would not
eradicate concerns about the Iranian nuclear program because it would not
prevent Iranian uranium enrichment, Turkish and Brazilian officials argued that
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it at least offered a confidence-building measure from which to reconstruct more
than five years of failed negotiations with Iran.
A similar proposal to the fuel-swap deal, led by the Vienna Group (France,
Russia, the United States, and the IAEA), had failed in 2009; therefore not
many members of the Security Council were optimistic about the capability of
Prime Minister Erdoğan and then-Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to
achieve a comprehensive agreement with Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad about going further with the Tehran Agreement. Since Tehran
and the permanent Security Council members mistrusted each other, Iran was
much more comfortable negotiating with Turkey and Brazil, and thus tried to
bolster its relations with the two significant intermediate states that were then
non-permanent members of the Security Council.39 Although Iran was still
uncertain about Turkish motivations, it conceded that Ankara was genuinely
trying to grow gradually independent from Washington. Iran was also aware that
Turkey aspired to prevent new sanctions that would negatively affect its own
interests. Turkey and Brazil’s strategy can be summarized as seeking greater global
influence, particularly in the Middle East, through active diplomacy. To that
end, the fuel-swap deal was viewed in Ankara as a success.
What Will Ankara Do Next?
Ultimately, the fuel-swap deal brokered by Turkey and Brazil was not a
comprehensive solution to Iran’s nuclear program because it did not address
interrupting Iranian production of uranium enriched to 20 percent. Iran did
indeed agree to deposit 1,200 kilograms of LEU in Turkey, but it would remain
the property of Iran, and Iranian officials could request the return of its LEU for
any reason if they desired to do so.40 The main problem with the deal was that it
did not fundamentally change Iran’s nuclear program.41 But Turkey never
intended it to achieve that ultimate objective; it was merely a first step toward
that end.
Nevertheless, numerous Turkish parliamentarians and diplomats have
acknowledged the problems regarding the deal,42 and they have recognized
the coordination problems with the United States and other Western powers
during the negotiations with Tehran. In terms of Ankara’s relations with the
United States, President Obama and Prime Minister Erdoğan have apparently
been in close contact since January 2011. The failure of the fuel-swap deal may
have led the two governments to increase their communication to help ensure
that another attempt at resolution succeeds. Coordination problems will try to
be eliminated in future efforts.43
Moving forward, the dynamics of overall Turkish—Iranian relations will be
crucial in curbing nuclear proliferation and controlling Iran’s nuclear program.
Turkey’s Role in Defusing the Iranian Nuclear Issue
































Ever since the two countries’ border was delineated in 1639, the Turkish—Iranian
relationship has been ‘‘nuanced and multifaceted and does not hinge on any
single issue, but is instead an amalgamation of sometimes competing, sometimes
common interests.’’44 Former AKP parliamentarian Murat Mercan, also the
former president of the Council of European Parliamentary Assembly, contends
that the two countries managed to coexist rather peacefully due to the isolation
from each other’s economic and political affairs for almost four centuries. But
problems surfaced when the AKP government came into power and tried to
bolster its relations with the Iranian regime. Turkish parliamentarians and
diplomats realized the differences between the two cultures and their threat
perceptions. Mercan contends that his encounters with Iranian officials such as
Ali Larijani, Speaker of the Iranian Majles, and Alaeddin Boroujerdi, Chair of
Foreign Policy and Security, did not inspire confidence. Mercan also asserts that
Shi‘a Muslims (Iran is a Shia-majority country; Turkey has a Sunni majority) have
a very different threat perception, and their history, culture, and society are quite
different from what is found in Turkey and the Arab world.45 This conception will
make it difficult for Turkey to play an active role in the negotiations.
Iran was skeptical about Turkey’s actions during
the mediations because Turkey is a NATO ally and
a strategic partner of the United States. Even
though Iran accepts the AKP government’s
growing independence from Washington’s
policies and Ankara’s aspiration to prevent new
sanctions that may affect its economic relations
with Iran, it is still dubious about Turkey’s
intentions, which were made clear during the
visit of Iranian officials to Turkey in October
2011.46 Iranian officials explicitly told the AKP
parliamentarians that they realized that Turkey was collaborating with American
officials behind closed doors.47
It seems that Ankara has yet to appreciate the significance of how its actions
are perceived by the international community as well. Although not a party in
the dispute between the international community and Iran, Turkey is affected by
the repercussions of any developments in it. This gives Turkey a vested interest
in the settlement’s progress (or lack thereof). Subsequently, Ankara’s impartiality
is questionable to the international community, no matter how much Turkish
policymakers insist otherwise.48
Although Ankara voted against the Security Council resolution that imposed
sanctions on Iran in July 2010, Iran is still concerned about the agreement signed
on September 15, 2011, between Turkey and the United States to station a U.S.
missile-defense radar in Kurecik, which lies in Turkey’s Malatya provincesome
Differences with
Iran will make it
difficult for Turkey
to play an active
role in negotiations.
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700 kilometers west of the Iranian border. AKP parliamentarian Hasan Fehmi
Kinay was quick to clarify that the Kurecik radar station had been in use
previously, and will merely begin functioning again.49 Nevertheless, Tehran is
suspicious.
One could argue that if mediation is not working, it eventually will be
regarded as futile. The feeling that Turkish mediation efforts have been misused
by the Iranian regime to buy time has not completely vanished from the mind of
Turkish officials.50 Economic sanctions are criticized because, as noted, Ankara
wants to improve its economic relations with Iran. However, sanctions have the
greatest effect if all countries apply them,
therefore Turkey may need to consider joining
the U.S. sanctions if it desires a non-military
solution to the problem.
Nevertheless, Turkish parliamentarian Volkan
Bozkir, who heads the parliamentary Foreign
Affairs Committee, set aside and rejected the
U.S. proposal to implement further sanctions on
Iran. He asserts that ‘‘countries should be careful
in warning Turkey [because] it’s not the country of
ten years ago. Is there any rule in the world that the U.S. can impose any sanctions
without any UN support or legal institutions?...We will abide by the UN
sanctions.’’51 Bozkir has been supportive of the increasing trade relations with
Iran, noting that trade was to reach $15 billion by the end of 2011, and that the
figure was expected to increase to $30 billion in 2012.52
Turkey therefore is still viewed by some as an advocate of Tehran; if Turkey
wants to help resolve the issue in the short term, former U.S. official Elliot
Abrams argues that ‘‘[i]t should stand firmly behind [the] UN Security Council
as well as the IAEA resolutions and urge Iran to comply with them.’’53 Anything
else, from the perspective of these observers, will diminish international unity
and allow the Iranian regime to buy even more time. Former European
Commissioner Gunter Verheugen stresses that the recent IAEA report made
public on November 8, 2011, ‘‘is alarming and something needs to be done,’’54
and argues that the best option is for Ankara to join the multilateral efforts. It is
understandable, however, that the AKP leadership would rather continue along
the path of dialogue, facilitation, and mediation.
In order to achieve its desired influence in the region, Turkey must prove its
will and ability to settle disputes in its neighborhood, particularly the Iranian
nuclear dispute. But Turkey has also realized that active diplomacy is not
enough, and zero problems with neighbors is not feasibletherefore it has
shifted its foreign policy. Turkey has drawn some lessons from its past experiences
with Iran, and after some resistance, it has decided to look for other energy
Turkey may need to
consider joining
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non-military solution
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resources.55 In line with this decision, in March
2012 Turkish officials announced that ‘‘it was
reducing oil imports from Iran by 20 percent.’’56
The AKP government is diversifying energy
supplies in the case of a disruption of Iranian oil
production.57 Turkey also intends ‘‘to build up
northern Iraq’s energy infrastructure to expand its
influence in Iraq and counter Iran.’’58 Currently,
AKP parliamentarians are preparing for any
eventuality, including the possibility of a military
strike on Iran. Nevertheless, through continuing negotiations, Turkish
policymakers, especially Foreign Minister Davutoglu, are dedicated to solving
the Iranian nuclear file in Istanbul this year.
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11. Mustafa Kibaroğlu and Aylin Gürzel, ‘‘US Nuclear Weapons in Turkey: Yankee Go
Home?’’ Russian Journal on International Security 83, no. 3 (Winter 2007): pp.
77—82.
12. Turkey is a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Biological
Weapons Convention (BWC,) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)—the







































13. Mustafa Kibaroglu, ‘‘Turkish Perspective on Iran’s Nuclearization,’’ Eurasia Critic,
April 2009, http://www.eurasiacritic.com/articles/turkish-perspectives-iran%E2%80%
99s-nuclearization.
14. See the official text of the treaty, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12006A/
12006A.htm.
15. Aaron Stein, ‘‘Understanding Turkey’s Position on the Iranian Nuclear Program,’’
WMD Junction, January 12, 2012, http://cns.miis.edu/wmdjunction/120112_turkey_
iran_nuclear.htm.
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